The “convergence” theory suggests that poorer states like Mississippi should have caught up to richer states like Connecticut over time. This economic projection held true in America’s history until about 1980, and some researchers blame overbearing residential zoning laws. More from the Boston Globe:
During the 100 years of high convergence, Americans moved in droves from poorer states to richer states in search of higher wages. As more people crowded into richer states, average wages there began to fall in response to the relative oversupply of workers; meanwhile wages in the poorer states began to rise for the relatively few workers who remained behind, creating a kind of economic balancing effect between American regions.
Theoretically this process should have continued until Mississippi and Connecticut were more or less equally desirable places to work and Shoag and Ganong propose a three-step explanation why it did not: Convergence stopped because labor migration stopped; labor migration stopped because housing prices in the richest states grew so out of whack that low-skilled workers could no longer afford to move in; and housing prices skyrocketed in response to zoning laws written in the 1970s that artificially restricted the amount and type of housing that could be built in richer locales.
Cincinnati’s sweeping 1924 voter-approved charter reforms were designed to enable the ouster of the Boss Cox Machine, and continue to form the framework of today’s municipal government. Although the new charter’s proponents, especially Murray Seasongood, celebrated the supposed perfection of their replacement City Manager System, the new city government was not designed for the long-term benefit of the citizenry so much as to keep the Cox Machine from returning to power in the 1927 or 1929 elections.
Since being implemented, the city manager and a nine-member council have remained a constant, but important features of the 1924 reforms have since been eliminated or replaced one-by-one by periodic voter-approved charter amendments.
Proportional representation ended in 1957, eight-year council term limits were introduced in 1991, and an independently elected mayor began in 1999.
Will the passage of Issue 4 pave the way for even more political reforms at City Hall?
The charter reforms destroyed the Cox Machine by changing nearly every feature of municipal government with the notable exception of council’s two-year term. Under Cox, an executive mayor reigned over a 32-seat council that was under machine control – although there might be significant turnover in a particular council election, new personnel had no real effect on the city’s direction.
With two-year terms, Cincinnati’s reform charter “good government” become chronically susceptible to flip-flopping and obstructionism due to at-large elections, the disappearance of the executive mayor, and tying the hands of a political machine that controlled who could run for council and how they voted once installed.
Issue 4, which is prominently discussed with Terry Grundy during Episode 11 of The UrbanCincy Podcast, promises to stabilize and therefore improve the effectiveness of city government by replacing the chaotic two-year election cycle with four-year terms held in the same years as mayoral elections. This arrangement will enable a mayor to set a four-year agenda he or she determines practical given the makeup of council. The charter language reads:
“Shall the Charter of the City of Cincinnati be amended to provide that the members of City Council shall be elected at-large for four-year terms by amending existing Sections 4, 5 and 5a of Article II, “Legislative Power”, existing Section 3 of Article III, “Mayor”, existing Sections 1, 2a and 2b of Article IX, “Nominations and Elections”, and existing Sections 1, 4 and 7 of Article XIII, “Campaign Finance”?”
The current eight-year term limits, enacted in 1991, will remain in effect. However, those new councilmen elected in 2011 including Yvette Simpson (D), Christopher Smitherman (I), P.G. Sittenfeld (D), Chris Seelbach (D), and Wendell Young (D) will be able to keep seats for a total of ten years if they are reelected in 2013 and 2017. While Roxanne Qualls (C) is eligible for a four-year term following three two-year terms, it is expected that she will run for mayor rather than council in 2013.
Opposing Arguments
Opponents have cast Issue 4 as a “power grab” by those currently holding seats on council. They also claim that council members should have to “face the voters” every two years, insinuating that council is inherently susceptible to corruption while ignoring the obstructionism that is enflamed by the two-year election cycle. Opponents also claim that short terms force council members to engage the city’s neighborhoods every two years as part of their reelection efforts.
Other opponents, including The Cincinnati Herald, argue that Cincinnati City Council should serve two-year terms because the U.S. and Ohio House of Representatives serve two-year terms. However, the U.S. and Ohio House are each one arm of bicameral legislatures – Everett, MA is the only remaining U.S. municipality with a bicameral city council.
Reappearance of Wards?
Issue 4 opponents have also argued against four-year terms by suggesting that switching City Council to a ward system will lead to better neighborhood representation and better city governance overall.
Under the current at-large system, many of Cincinnati’s 52 neighborhoods are being ignored in favor of Downtown and Over-the-Rhine, ward system advocates claim. The true motivation for wards, however, appears to be an attempt to break up the current Democrat majority, several of whom reside Downtown and in Over-the-Rhine.
If Issue 4 passes this November, we might see an effort in 2013 for sweeping charter reforms, including wards, intended to disrupt the potential eight-year tenure of Roxanne Qualls as mayor and a majority Democrat-led city council.
Those who would like to learn more about the Boss Cox era of politics in Cincinnati can do so by reading Jake Mecklenborg’s book, Cincinnati’s Incomplete Subway: The Complete History, which profiles how the charter reform government, led by Murray Seasongood, smeared the subway project in its efforts to embarrass Boss Cox.
A pair of locally produced documentaries will be showcased tomorrow during the first ever MidPoint Film Festival, which is being used to help kick-off the three-day MidPoint Music Festival.
The first will is a film about the rebirth of Cincinnati’s historic Over-the-Rhine neighborhood, and the second is a new film highlighting the history of Newport’s seedy past. The festival is being hosted by Midland Film Institute and will make its debut at the School for Creative & Performing Arts’ (SCPA) Mayerson Theater.
Part of the film crew works on Rebirth of Over-the-Rhine along Elm Street. Photograph provided.
Rebirth of Over-the-Rhine, which was highlighted by UrbanCincy in 2010, covers the nascent redevelopment of the historically struggling neighborhood and how the interplay of social and economic forces is being brought out in the rapidly changing neighborhood. It is directed by award winning director Melissa Godoy.
“We started looking around and we found we were right at the beginning of this push. The history of the neighborhood, combined with its present-day components, really helped to make the story,” co-producer Joe Brinker told UrbanCincy.
The film has been shot in Over-the-Rhine between 2009 and 2012, and highlights some of the social struggles surrounding Washington Park.
Newport Gangster, meanwhile, showcases the gambling legacy of Newport, Kentucky, the original Sin City. The film highlights the scale of Newport’s gambling scene and how it gave birth to the modern gambling industry.
The event is free to the public although a $10 donation is encouraged. Both films will also host a question and answer session with their directors and producers. The film festival will begin at SCPA (map) Thursday, September 27 at 6pm. Those interested in attending are encouraged to RSVP online.
Art Modell’s two most notorious business decisions – the 1963 firing of Paul Brown and the 1996 move of the Browns to Baltimore – each had profound unintended effects in Cincinnati. Upon Modell’s recent passing on September 6, Cincinnati media noted that Brown’s ouster led directly to his 1968 founding of the Bengals, but the story is much more complex.
In 1961 Modell bought Paul Brown’s minority share of the Cleveland Browns for $500,000, and was then contractually obligated to pay his head coach’s salary for several years after his firing. It was with this money that Brown and investor Austin Knowlton established the Bengals and resolved to beat the Browns on the field and Modell in the business of owning an NFL franchise.
But the greater issue missed by the local media was Mike Brown’s 1996 negotiation of a stadium lease that, in two ways, assures the Bengals franchise he inherited from his legendary father will avoid a similar fate to Modell’s Browns and Ravens.
First, Brown will never be burdened with unpredictable stadium maintenance costs or the loss of a tenant. Second, the terms of the Paul Brown Stadium lease are so favorable that in late 2011 the Brown family paid approximately $200 million in cash to buy out minority owner Austin Knowlton. With no significant minority owners remaining, the Brown family is invulnerable to the sort of hostile takeover that brought down Art Modell — twice.
“The Move”
On December 17, 1995, just weeks after Modell announced his decision to move the Browns to Baltimore, footage of Browns fans tearing apart Cleveland’s Municipal Stadium was broadcast nationwide:
Scenes of Browns fans tearing apart Municipal Stadium were shown across the United States in 1995.
The groundwork for this mob scene was laid decades earlier, when Modell negotiated control of Cleveland Municipal Stadium from the City of Cleveland during its infamous financial crisis. The terms of the deal gave Modell all revenues – including luxury box revenue – from the city-owned stadium in exchange for upkeep and nominal annual rent. For 20 years Modell was able to maintain the 1930s-era stadium in part with luxury box revenue collected from the Indians (this lack of revenue for the Indians helped make them perennial AL East basement dwellers).
Folklore surrounding The Move speculates that Art Modell failed to anticipate that luxury box owners would abandon the Browns entirely after the Indians moved to Jacobs Field in 1994. But more astute observers assert that Cleveland’s business community used The Gateway Project – which built Gund Arena for the Cavs and Jacobs Field for the Indians but made no provision for Modell’s Browns – as a way to strip Modell of his Indians luxury box revenue and send his finances into a tailspin.
Mike Trivassono, sports host for Cleveland’s WTAM, asserts that this trap was sprung in order to transfer ownership of the Browns from majority owner Art Modell to minority owner Al Lerner. In 1999 the NFL sold the new Cleveland Browns franchise to Lerner for $500 million, and in 2012 Lerner’s son sold the team to Jimmy Haslam III for $1 billion.
The Move’s Effect in Cincinnati
After Paul Brown died in 1991, his son Mike assumed control of the team. The younger Brown, a graduate of Harvard Law School, maneuvered to put the Bengals well ahead of the Reds in negotiations with Hamilton County for a new stadium and lease – he would not be cornered by Cincinnati’s other professional sports franchise in the way Modell allowed himself to be compromised by Cleveland’s Gateway Project.
Brown knew from his experience sharing county-owned Riverfront Stadium with the Reds, and Modell’s loss of the Indians, that the NFL’s financial structure cannot work in multi-purpose stadiums. He also knew that terms that removed Bengals ownership from any responsibility in maintaining or upgrading their future stadium were essential to eliminating unknowns from later years of the lease.
It is important to recognize that the lease is structured so that the Brown Family – Mike Brown will be in his 90s if he lives to negotiate a new lease –will enter negotiations in the mid-2020’s in a position of financial strength, rather than Modell’s state of desperation.
Political and Cultural Fallout In the 12 years since the first game was played at Paul Brown Stadium, Hamilton County’s financial obligations to the Bengals have remained a current event. The media and serving Hamilton County Commissioners are correct in placing some blame on the Commissioners who structured the stadium fund around an expected 3% annual increase in tax receipts. The source of the ongoing stadium controversy, however, is largely the creation of Hamilton County’s current commissioners who continue to play politics with the residential property tax rollback enacted in 1996.
The deal cut to fund the construction of Paul Brown Stadium has plagued Hamilton County since its passage. Photograph by Jayson Gomes.
By refusing to budge (except in 2010) on the inconsequential amount of money the rollback saves county homeowners, they are able keep the county in a perpetual state of crisis. They have then used this artificial crisis to justify shady activities, such as the recent sale of Drake Hospital.
The Long-Term Future of Paul Brown Stadium
Part of the 1990s effort to fund construction of two new stadiums in Cincinnati involved smearing Riverfront Stadium. A stadium celebrated as “The Jungle” during the 1988 Superbowl year was suddenly derided as “sterile”. Images of exposed parking garage rebar convinced the public that the stadium was too costly to repair. And other cities –notably Cleveland and Pittsburgh – had already started on new stadiums.
Save an unforeseeable change in the NFL’s revenue sharing arrangement, upon the expiration of the Bengals lease in 2026, Paul Brown Stadium should still be a profitable home for the Bengals or another NFL franchise. This means the motivation for a new football stadium will not come from the Brown family or the ownership of a replacement NFL franchise, but rather Hamilton County, should it determine that renovation and ongoing maintenance costs will approach the cost of debt service on a new stadium.
Lost in the never-ending stadium conversation in Cincinnati was the news that even after the epic drama and financial promise of The Move, Art Modell was forced to sell his majority ownership of the Baltimore Ravens in 2004 to a minority owner. As a result, just 1% of Ravens ownership will be passed onto his heirs.
In 2026 memories of Art Modell and The Move will have faded in Northeastern Ohio and his heirs might have completely exited Ravens ownership. But the grandchildren of the man Modell fired back in 1963 will still be in the football business, in complete command of a franchise worth well over $1 billion, and in negotiations for a new lease with Hamilton County or the ownership of a stadium elsewhere in the country.
It was eleven years ago today that two glass, steel and concrete towers that once dominated the skyline of Manhattan fell in the worst terrorist attack in the history of this country and thousands of lives were lost. But these photographs from the 1970’s by Brooklyn native Baldwin S. Lee and Professor of Art at the University of Tennessee look back on a time when the then recently completed World Trade Center stood above the struggling old city below it.
At the time of its completion in 1971 the World Trade Center complex boasted 16 million square feet of office space in three low rise buildings and two 110-story towers designed by Minoru Yamasaki. The World Trade Center held the record for the world’s tallest buildings from 1971 to 1973 after being surpassed in height by the Willis Tower in Chicago. More World Trade Center photographs from Professor Lee:
